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Abstract 
This paper explores the causes of, and evaluates possible remedies for, the decline of 
public transport in Melbourne. Travel patterns in urban areas are characterised by 
diversity: origins and destinations are dispersed and travel occurs throughout the day. 
Traditional forms of public transport, oriented to peak period, central city commuters, 
have had difficulty coping with this diversity. The currently popular response to this 
problem in Australia is based on the 'economic rationalists' remedies of privatisation 
and deregulation. But other cities have responded with the opposite policies, planning 
and coordination of services. 
This exploration of the two approaches is carried out through a comparison of public 
transport policy in Melbourne, where patronage has declined at world-beating rates in 
the last four decades, with Toronto, which has been much more successful. The 
reason for the contrasting patronage performances is found to lie in the different 
policies pursued in the two cities. These differences date from decisions taken in both 
cities in response to crises in public transport policy following the first world war and 
again in the 1950s. 
In Toronto, services have been planned and integrated by a public monopoly; policy in 
Melbourne has been market-driven, and based around competition and extensive private 
sector involvement. Toronto's centrally planned system has proven the more flexible in 
car ownership. While public transport operators in Melbourne have competed with one 
another, Toronto's single operator has competed with the car. 
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DO PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC TRANSPORT MIX? 
An Australian-Canadian comparison. 
Post-modern travellers 
. Once, the urban transportation problem was regarded as an engineering 
question: providing the necessary 'capacity' to carry large 'flows' of 
commuters. Such debates as there were revolved around questions like: how 
wide should the roads be; where would the cars be parked and could rail 
transport ease the load? In the last three decades, the questions have become 
more numerous and more complex. Environmentalists have called attention to 
the damage created by road building and car use, while sociologists have 
pointed to transport's role in providing 'access for all' (Schaeffer & Sclar, 
1975). 
A curious convergence of post-modernist, feminist and technology-based 
thinking agrees that people's travel is becoming more diverse and flexible, 
both in space and time. A new image of increasingly complex cross-city trips 
made throughout the day in low density suburbs contrasts with the traditional 
metaphors of 'tidal flows' of commuters to and from central business districts. 
(Whether it is travel patterns themselves, or merely our image of them, that 
have changed is, of course, debatable - cf. Mees, 1995.) Some argue that 
public transport simply cannot compete with the car in such an environment: 
[I]t is because of the messiness and indeterminacy of mobility that the car is rightly 
the most useful and popular form of transport ... [Women's] journeys tend to be 
more complex, unpredictable and flexible .. (Huxley, 1995) 
Huxley argues that public transport cannot match the 'go anywhere, anytime' 
convenience of the car for even a significant minority of trips, a view shared 
by Brotchie et al (1995), who write not from a feminist, but from an 
engineering-technological perspective. The focus of public transport policy 
debates has shifted from engineering issues like capacity, to whether, and if so 
how, public transport can be provided effectively and economically to a 
population with diverse travel needs. The problem is exacerbated by the low-
density form of most recent suburban development, which appears to rule out 
the type of comprehensive public transport provided by densely patronised 
systems like the Paris metro. Transport planners of the 1970s sought ways to 
make public transport in low-density cities flexible and demand-responsive 
like the car. The two most popular suggestions were 'personal rapid transit', a 
Disneyland-style technology much discussed but never implemented, and 
'dial-a-bus', the subject of numerous, mainly unsuccessful, trials (Pushkarev 
& Zupan, 1977, pp. 70, 133-7). ' 
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Creative chaos? 
In the 1980s, economics- and engineering-based transport planners began to 
converge around a new solution, albeit one initially mooted in the 1960s 
(Meyer, Kain & Wohl, 1965, pp. 355-9). Rather than drawing inspiration from 
Walt Disney, transport planners looked to the chaotic urban public transport 
found in developing countries. Cities such as Bangkok support a diverse array 
of public transport offerings, from slow, overcrowded conventional buses 
offering very cheap fares, to privately operated 'jitneys' charging higher fares 
for superior service, to taxis. Here, it seemed, was the flexibility, innovation 
and specialisation for which planners had been searching. 
Many commentators have argued that a similarly rich array of public transport 
offerings could be provided in developed cities, and that the main barrier is 
over-regulation of public transport. Remove or reduce regulation and 
innovation, particularly in the fonn of demand-responsive services, minibuses 
and other 'intennediate' modes between buses and taxis, will flourish. Thus, 
Gordon & Richardson (1994) advocate for the Los Angeles area a transport 
policy with thn e elements: price roads, introduce bus priority systems and 
"deregulate va·., taxi, and jitney services to encourage innovation and 
entrepreneurship in creating these new modes." 
The 'Bangkok' model for urban public transport did not develop in isolation. 
In Australia, as in other English-speaking countries, public discourse has been 
dominated since the 1980s by what Australians call 'economic rationalism' , 
but in North America carries the name public choice theory. Self (1993) 
provides a description and critique of these doctrines, whose main 
consequences for public policy he summarises as "slimming the state" and 
"restructuring government". Slimming the state involves reducing government 
expenditure and privatising government agencies. Restructuring government 
entails "measures to refashion the operations of government along market 
lines" (p. 61 ), such as subdivision into smaller units that can compete against 
one another. Deregulation of urban public transport fits neatly into the public 
choice prescription, which may account for its popularity with transport 
economists. Since the model can be applied most readily to road-based forms 
of public transport, and involves public transport types that resemble the car, it 
also appeals to transport planners with road engineering backgrounds. 
The principal advocate of public choice doctrines in Australia is the Industry 
Commission (IC), which completed a report on urban transport in 1994. The 
Commission argues that existing urban transport lacks "the flexibility to cope 
with changing travel patterns and with social and technological changes" (IC, · 
1994, p. 3). Public transport, while retaining a role for central business district 
commuters and the disadvantaged, is centrally planned and therefore 
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inflexible, is over-regulated and incurs large deficits. The solution is to 
deregulate, introduce competition, expand the role of private operators and 
increase fares, especially for peak period commuters. The IC 'reform package' 
for public transport has the following key themes: 
· • splitting integrated public transport operating authorities into separate mode-
and area- based units (the recommendation for Melbourne is separate 
'autonomous business units' covering trams, trains and buses - p. 278, with 
bus operations further subdivided into competing depot-based units - p. 375); 
• privatising government-owned operations; 
• increasing fares; and 
• encouraging competition between different public transport operators and 
modes. 
The IC predicts that the outcome will be reduced deficits and more flexible 
and customer-responsive services: 
The need for competition in the delivery of urban public transport services is most 
pressing. This is the most effective way of securing the lowest possible operating 
costs and the service improvements that people value most. (IC, 1994, pp. 9-10) 
The conditions under which deregulated public transport apparently thrives in 
cities like Bangkok are, of course, virtually the opposite of those found in the 
suburbs of Australian cities. Incomes and car ownership are low and 
population densities high, creating concentrated, high-volume flows of 
passengers rather than dispersed, low-density travel patterns. Low wage levels 
permit the use of labour-intensive vehicles like jitneys. So perhaps the 
apparent flexibility of Bangkok public transport is simply a result of these 
factors, coupled with poor quality (but cheap) conventional bus service. If so, 
a different approach may be called for in places where patronage is sparse. 
Planned network? 
Major airlines in the USA operate in an environment of dispersed, if not low-
density, demand. They rely on 'hubbing' to reduce operating costs by 
achieving economic densities of patronage. American Greyhound has 
employed a similar strategy to survive an environment of low-density, multi-
directional demand (Berechman, 1993, pp. 194-6, 267-70). The Paris metro is 
a successful urban illustration of the network approach, although it operates in 
a high-density environment. Passengers trade off the inconvenience of having 
to transfer between services, and some indirect journeys, against a high level 
of service (frequency, hours of operation) and low fares. The result is a 'go 
anywhere, anytime' service that for most trips matches the convenience of the 
car (although changing trains is not as convenient as it could be, because the 
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initial Metro lines, having been constructed separately, were not designed to 
• facilitate transfers). 
The network issue is rarely canvassed in the urban transport planning 
literature. Most analyses of the effectiveness of strategies to increase 
patronage of public transport rely instead on demand elasticities, which are 
estimates of the percentage change in the number of trips that occurs in 
response to a change in fares, service levels, etc. Most studies have found the 
elasticity of demand with respect to service to be much less than one, meaning 
that a 1 % increase in service will increase patronage by much less than 1 % 
(Pushkarev & Zupan, 1977, p. 14). This in turn means that service increases 
are unlikely to generate sufficient revenue to cover their costs. Service 
increases will also reduce vehicle occupancies, eroding public transport's 
environmental edge over the car. The result is a kind of law of diminishing 
returns. An interesting exception, which takes network issues into account and 
which I have adapted and extended here, appeared recently in a most unlikely 
source, the Environmental Effects Statement for Melbourne's largest-ever 
freeway project (Vicroads, 1994, pp. 22-3). 
Imagine a hypothetical city called 'Squaresville', comprised of 100 blocks, as 
in figure 1. Squaresville has a rectangular pattern of streets, which bisect the 
blocks and provide routes suitable for public transport services at convenient 
intervals (say 800 metres). Assume that travel patterns are entirely dispersed, 
with each block generating 99 trips, one to each of the other blocks, a total of 
9900 trips. Consider a single public transport route offering a high level of 
service along a North-South corridor to a once-dominant central business 
district. The route runs through the middle of the 10 blocks that make up the 
corridor, and serves passengers with trip origins in the corridor, since 
passengers are prepared to walk half a block to a stop. This corridor generates 
a total of 990 trips, but the public transport route is only capable of serving the 
90 of these trips which have origins and destinations along its route. If there 
are ten such routes, one along each North-South corridor, as in Figure 1, 
public transport can serve a total of 900 trips, less than 10% of journeys in 
Squaresville. Assume that, at present, public transport attracts one-third of the 
journeys it can theoretically serve. This gives 300 trips, and a modal share 
across the whole city of 3%. 
What would be the effect of doubling public transport service levels in 
Squaresville? A traditional transport planning model, based on elasticities of 
demand, would suggest that a 100% increase in service may produce a 50% 
increase in demand, increasing daily trips to 450 and modal share to 4.5%. 
s 
Figure 1: 'Squaresville' (with 10 public transport routes) 
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Since doubling service will almost certainly increase costs by more than 50%, 
cost-recovery is likely to fall. But what if the increase in service is used to add 
ten East-West public transport routes, creating a grid network of 20 routes, ten 
in each direction? The number of trips served directly would double to 1800, 
since there are twice as many routes. But if passengers are willing to transfer 
between routes, as is the case on the Paris metro, then all 9900 trips can be 
made by public transport, 1800 directly and 8100 by transferring. This is an 
increase of 1000%. Even if the modal share for journeys involving a transfer 
is only half that for direct journeys, this would still produce a dramatic 
increase in patronage, to 1950 trips (a third of 1800 plus a sixth of 8100). 
Increased revenue should more than offset the costs of the increased service, 
vehicle occupancies would rise and modal share across Squaresville would 
increase from 3% to 20%. 
This model is an illustration of the argument that comprehensive planning 
which knits individual routes into an economical regional network may be 
able to overcome the law of diminishing returns that is frequently assumed to 
rule out substantial upgrades of public transport. Interestingly, the more 
dispersed travel demands are the stronger the network effect. In a hypothetical 
city where all journeys are made to a single point, there is no benefit at all. 
This suggests that public transport in metropolitan areas with dispersed travel 
patterns may be a natural monopoly, and contrasts with the more common 
view of transport economists (e.g. Berechman, 1993, p. 308) that public 
transport is only a natural monopoly in dense, centralised inner cities, if at all. 
The principal prerequisite of the network effect is that passengers be willing to 
transfer between services. This in tum requires a series of conditions not 
usually associated with free-market systems: convenient physical facilities at 
interchange points, a fare system in which transfers are free ·and a timetable 
that encourages transfers. The best type of timetable is one offering high 
frequency services on all corridors, as Hussler (1994) notes in an analysis of 
the success of the City of Zurich's public transport network: 
The network of trams and buses work on a four to eight minutes frequency during 
the day. It is important that the frequency of services remains under ten minutes. If 
it is over ten minutes, changing from one line to another is not attractive. With a ten 
minutes frequency you have a network effect; with a twenty minutes frequency 
people don ' t change from one line to another. 
But can such high service levels be provided in lower-density environments, 
such as those found in Australian cities? 
· 
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Looking for evidence 
Frisken ( 1991) argues that North American public choice theorists who 
advocate competition-based models for the public sector have conducted few 
comparisons of 'real-world' performance among different models. Similar 
accusations have been levelled at Australian public choice advocates including 
the Industry Commission (e.g. Quiggin, 1993). The relative merits of 
competition and planning for urban public transport are often simply asserted. 
One way of testing these assertions is to examine the track record of the 
different policies. 
The first experiment with urban public transport deregulation began in 1979 in 
Santiago, Chile, under the Pinochet regime. The experiment appears to have 
been unsuccessful, and was reversed on the restoration of democratic 
government (Koprich, 1994). The best known case is the deregulation of bus 
services in British cities outside London, a measure introduced by the 
Thatcher government in 1985 following the publication of the White Paper 
'Buses'. A modified version of the British approach was introduced in New 
Zealand in 1989, but the results are difficult to assess, since one result of the 
policy was the disappearance of publicly available information on trends in 
patronage. 
The British experience has been discussed extensively. The Industry 
Commission Urban Transport report presents the UK as a role model for 
Australia. Benefits of deregulation are said to include reduced government 
subsidies, lower operating costs, improved productivity and greater innovation 
(particularly increased use of mini-buses), while initial concerns about the 
policy were proven unfounded (IC, 1994, p. 145). 
A starkly contrasting assessment is provided by the report 'Transport and the 
Environment' of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
which, like the IC report, was released in 1994. The Royal Commission notes 
that the effects of deregulation have been well-documented by a series of 
studies (none of which is mentioned in the IC report), which found that 
subsidies were indeed reduced, but that: 
fares increased sharply, many services were reduced, networks were restructured 
and became less stable. The general impression was of declining services. The 
immediate sharp drop in patronage is not therefore surprising. There was also a 
deterioration in the extent of bus-rail integration ... Competition has generally not 
been widespread or sustained, although there are exceptions. Where it has taken 
place, it has usually been on popular routes where more vehicles have not 
necessarily led to a better service for passengers, but may have increased urban 
congestion and pollution ... (RCEP, 1994, p. 219) 
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Concluding that the reduction in subsidies achieved through deregulation 
"may have been bought at too high a price", the Royal Commission 
recommends that deregulation be abandoned and regional planning of services 
recommence (p. 220). The British experience was most recently reviewed by 
Mackie et al (1995), who report a 35.5% decline in patronage from 1985/6 to 
1993/4 in cities where deregulation was introduced, contrasting with a 3.0% 
decline in London, where central planning was retained. The authors argue 
that this decline shows that the experience of developing countries was not 
transferable to Britain. Competition did lead to increased service levels, but in 
a wasteful manner, rather than through the kind of network effect illustrated in 
the Squaresville example. 
The Industry Commission's views are shared by most leading Australian 
transport planning professionals, although Hensher (1994) concedes that the 
British experience has produced mixed results. The trend away from public 
transport in developed cities is unstoppable, but public transport retains a role 
for 'niche markets' such as "school children, households with low incomes, a 
declining proportion of the elderly, those who have no automobile available in 
the household, who live in a central city and work in or adjacent to the central 
business district, and who live in a densely settled area." (Hensher, 1994, p. 
50) These niches will best be served by flexible, demand-responsive public 
transport operated by private enterprise with minimal government 
interference. Ogden (1995) advocates a system of 'suburban' public transport 
for Melbourne in which greater competition produces 
a wide range of services, each oriented to a market niche. In addition to the fixed 
route, heavy bus operation focussed on railway stations, we would expect to see 
smaller buses operating as 'jitneys' .. ; 'dial a ride' services .. ; demand responsive 
services .. ; shared taxi operations of many forms (especially at night). And no doubt 
many more. (p. 8) 
Another speaker at the same forum series where Ogden unveiled his proposal 
described a very different model of public transport: 
In Toronto, Canada, there is an excellent example of a public transport system 
which appears, to the passenger at least, to effortlessly integrate train, tram/light rail 
and bus. Although, in principle, this would not seem to be an unreasonable 
objective, in practice, it is an achievement which has, to date, escaped most other 
cities who seek it. Those in Toronto, a long time ago, made the managerial, 
technical and operational policies and decisions necessary to integrate their public 
transport system, despite the obvious difficulties associated with merging the 
various elements. (Dixon, 1995, p. 143). 
Toronto 's success in providing public transport is frequently noted (e.g. 
Hutchinson, 1986). While the majority of travel in Metropolitan Toronto is by 
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car, public transport has retained a healthy share of the travel market, in 
contrast with the decline seen elsewhere (Figure 2). Frisken (1991) argues that 
the success of Toronto's public transport relative to US cities can be in part 
related to its strong metropolitan government, and offers "an empirical dissent 
from the public choice paradigm". Doucet (1977) regards the public takeover 
of the transit system in 1921 as vital, and Frisken ( 1984) describes the record 
of the Toronto Transportation Commission from 1921 to 1953 as "a triumph 
for public ownership". Davis (1978) counters that public takeovers at similar 
times in US cities (e.g. Detroit in 1922) did not save public transport, because 
of significant differences, including race problems and higher car ownership 
in the US cities (pp. 62-3; 76-79). 
Regardless of whether Davis is correct about US cities, it remains striking that 
Toronto has been so much more successful than Melbourne, given the 
similarities in the character, form and history of the two cities. These include 
similar populations (3.1 million and 3.8 million for the respective census areas 
in 1991 ), the British colonial legacy, lower car ownership than the USA, the 
absence of American-style race problems, and the persistence of trams. Both 
cities, like Squaresville, have grid arterial road networks and, possibly more 
importantly, are characterised by low population densities in contrast with 
cities like Paris and Zurich. 
Other Australian commentators (e.g. Kenworthy, 1991) have explained the 
difference by focussing on land-use planning in Toronto, particularly the 
integration of high-density housing with rapid transit stations. In earlier 
works, however, I concluded that population density has declined, and 
employment dispersed, more rapidly in Toronto than in Melbourne since the 
Second World War, and that the share of the population living within walking 
distance of rapid transit stations is actually greater in Melbourne (Mees, 1994, 
1996). Toronto's superior performance is primarily due to the way public 
transport has been operated and in particular to the type of policies Dixon 
describes in the above extract. My argument here is that the adoption of these 
policies relates to matters at the heart of the planning-competition debate, 
namely that Toronto's public transport has been regionally planned by a single 
public authority since 1921, while Melbourne' s has featured extensive 
competition for over a century and, in the private bus sector, a textbook 
example of the public choice model. 
Melbourne: where have all the jitneys gone? 
The reforms proposed for public transport by the Industry Commission and 
Ogden are actually a reversion to the traditional Melbourne model of separate, 
competing rail, tram and bus services. The three modes of public transport 
began as separate undertakings and remained so: 
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•the 'suburban' (as opposed to 'country') rail network was opened in the 
1850s by the Melbourne and Hobson's Bay Railway Company, but was sold 
in 1878 to the Victorian Railways, a statutory corporation which greatly 
expanded the system in the 1880s; 
•the tram network was opened from 1886 to 1891 by a private cable car 
operator, with electrified lines added by municipalities and private operators, 
and the whole system taken over in 1919 by another statutory corporation, the 
Melbourne & Metropolitan Tramways Board; 
•buses commenced following the First World War, with a plethora of small 
private operators. 
Each public transport undertaking had its own routes, timetables and fare 
system, with little coordination and fierce competition. Davison (1978) 
records: 
By 1890 few cities of Melboume's size boasted a [public transport] system as 
advanced, extensive or convenient. In fact, it is arguable that the system was 
becoming dangerously overgrown. Its two main operators were falling into the 
misbegotten strategy of attempting to annex each other's natural catchments and, by 
the turn of the century, railways and tramways intersected at no less than eighteen 
points. This of course was not necessarily unhealthy - they might possibly have 
interlocked to offer mutual support - but in practice they seem to have constructed 
their routes so as to suck rather than feed each other's services. (p. 170) 
The 19th century pattern was repeated following the Great War, when both the 
suburban rail network and the tram system were converted to electric 
operation. The MMTB used the replacement of cable trams with electric 
services as an opportunity to extend the tram system, making further inroads 
into the viability of the rail system. As observers noted in 1953: 
in the inner suburbs where the population has been constant [since 1938], railway 
bookings have declined by 26.5% .. . the reason is not competition from private cars, 
but from trams. (MMBW, 1953, p.192) 
To the competing tram and rail systems was added the private bus industry, 
which can hardly be described as a system at all. Buses operated according to 
a classic public-choice model, replete with jitneys. Initially, there was little 
regulation of bus operators, and virtually none for 'cabs', buses with eight 
seats or less, so "[bus operators] began running where they thought there'd be 
patronage, regardless of whether it was already being served by other 
operators or by the growing tramway system" (Maddock, 1992, p. 9). In 
contrast with most developed cities, including Toronto (Doucet, 1977, pp. 25-
7), which regulated jitneys out of existence, Melbourne offered an excellent 
opportunity for the service innovations envisaged by public choice theorists. 
II 
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The rail system and most tram lines formed a radial pattern focussed on the 
central business district, so a natural niche for innovative bus operators would 
have been to provide cross-suburban links to fill the gaps left by the radial 
network, and 'feeder' services to new housing estates growing up beyond tram 
stops and railway stations. But the initial thrust of bus operators was to 
compete, rather than complement. The major routes focussed on the already 
well-served central business district and parallelled radial train and tram lines, 
with most main routes running along Swanston Street/ St Kilda Road, the 
principal traffic artery and cable tram route (Maddock, 1992: l 0). This was 
partly a response to a 'niche' opened up by the mess of tram lines inherited by 
the Tramways Board, which required most Swanston Street passengers to 
change from an electric to a cable tram en route. But when the Board began to 
electrify and integrate its network in the 1920s, and regulations were enacted 
to restrict 'predatory' competition, the larger bus operators closed their 
operations rather than seeking new opportunities, leaving suburban operations 
to an army of returned servicemen who pioneered the Melbourne route bus 
industry. 
The smaller operators mainly drove seven-seat 'cabs' (jitneys), and operated 
without fixed timetables, providing a working model of the type of public 
transport envisaged by public choice advocates. As might have been 
predicted, the services operated were indeed 'flexible', as one operator 
interviewed by Maddock noted: 
In those times practically every street that ran across a suburb to the Sydney Road 
tram route running north and south had either a cab service or a bus service on it--
little two-section runs of about a mile-and-a-half or two miles long. The cab owners 
operated a sort of timetable agreed among themselves. It was something of a catch-
as-you-can business: although they worked to what were roughly fixed routes, they 
really had no schedules. They would move off as soon as they had five people 
aboard. They plied for hire as long as there was some sort of demand. If there 
wasn't, they'd simply disappear .. (Maddock, 1992, p. 28) 
But what looks like flexibility from the perspective of the operator can easily 
mean unreliability for passengers, as Maddock's informant conceded: 
It was pretty rough and ready, to say the least, and the system was somewhat 
unreliable as far as the paying public was concerned. (p. 29) 
Maddock reports other disadvantages of the deregulated environment, such as 
'dragging' routes (deliberately running late to poach passengers from the bus . 
following behind), and concludes: 
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Cab-style operation was a very haphazard affair; service was provided as traffic 
warranted and if the owner decided he'd rather spend the afternoon at the races or 
elsewhere he'd simply do that and passengers would have to find other means of 
transport or walk. (pp. 22-3) 
While multiple ownership was in vogue there was little prospect of an improvement 
in service. If an owner's bus broke down there was not always a vehicle to replace 
it. Traffic played havoc with schedule-keeping and it was not always possible to 
feed in additional buses along a route to get it back onto timetable. (p. 12) 
The first attempt to regulate the bus industry was the Motor Omnibus Act of 
1925, which gave the Melbourne City Council power to grant licences for bus 
services throughout metropolitan Melbourne. In 1934, oversight of suburban 
services was transferred to the Transport Regulation Board which, in 1952, 
acquired responsibility for regulation of bus services throughout Victoria. As 
indicated previously, jitneys were exempted from these regulations, but these 
vehicles had largely disappeared by the end of the 1930s. Apart from 
restrictions on 'predatory' competition with tram lines, there were few 
restrictions on larger buses, with multiple-operator routes permitted until the 
Transport Regulation Board decided, in the mid-1950s, to encourage multiple 
operators to amalgamate into companies, a process which took a further two · 
decades to finalise. 
An illustration of this 'free market' system in action is provided by route 10, · 
one of the original services dating back to the early 1920s, and the route on · 
which jitney operation lasted longest (Maddock, 1992, p.31 ). The route. 
commenced as a multiple-operator service provided by more than a dozen 
drivers, each of whom owned one jitney. The initial route was a classic 
predatory service, running from suburban Box Hill railway station to the city 
rail terminus at Spencer Street Station (Maddock, 1992: 42), paralleling the 
rail line and actually duplicating the full length of a cable tram service. In 
1925, regulators compelled the bus operators to terminate in the inner eastern 
suburb of Abbotsford to protect the newly-electrified tram route. In 1933, the 
route was split into two to suit the convenience of one operator, who had 
acquired a small fleet of buses. The remaining route section was operated by 
owner-drivers, who gradually replaced their jitneys with second-hand larger 
buses, but whose numbers dwindled over the years as vehicle breakdown or 
falling revenues claimed them. The demise of the route was described as 
follows in the Bus and Coach Society's newsletter: 
At 6.40 pm on Friday 19th December 1969, owner-driver Phil Venier pulled 
his bus into Canterbury terminus to cease operation for this day - and forever. 
Thus the colourful history of one of Melboume's oldest private bus routes ·came to a 
close. Phil commenced as an owner-driver in 1932 with a seven-passenger 
[jitney ] ... The number of buses on the route gradually dwindled over the years 
from 18 to one, and now none. This decline started many years ago ... 
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One of the operators withdrew his [bus] quite early in the piece, and t he other 
four continued to provide the service until well into the '60s, when the Ford 
[bus], older than the rest was withdrawn. The remaining three continued until 
about a year ago when Mr. P.G.McCallum withdrew because he found it 
increasingly difficult to make a living out of the route. The service was then 
provided by two [buses] until Mr. A.H.Cotton's 'did' a gearbox early in 
November and was withdrawn. Phil Venier continued operation for another five or 
six weeks to see out the school year. (Maddock, 1992: 33) 
The effect on service quality on this route was recounted by Fouvy (1970, p. 
4.134). A 10-minute off-peak service frequency was provided until the 1950s, 
then reduced to 15 minutes, then cancelled in the early 1960s. Peak service 
levels were further reduced until the route closed completely. Fouvy notes that 
a service along the adjacent parallel arterial road had ceased operation about 
20 years earlier. The service decline was exacerbated by the fact that the 
changes happened at random as owner-operators dropped out. 
Melbourne's unplanned public transport survived the depression and war 
years, in which first the high cost of cars, then economic hardship, and then 
petrol rationing ensured a large supply of 'captive' patrons, not unlike the 
situation in Bangkok today. Wartime petrol rationing lasted until 1950, and as 
late as 1951 a survey conducted by the Melbourne & Metropolitan Board of 
Works in preparation for the city's first Metropolitan Planning Scheme found 
very high rates of public transport usage. But could this continue in an era of 
rising incomes, expectations and car ownership? 
For some Melburnians, public transport did offer a convenient service. High 
numbers of captive patrons ensured frequent service on most train and tram 
services, which followed radial routes terminating in the central business 
district. A resident living within walking distance of a stop or station and 
wishing to travel to the CBD or a point along the route was provided with a 
high level of service. But anyone living beyond walking distance of trams or 
trains, or travelling across the suburbs, or needing to transfer between modes 
to complete a journey, received an extremely poor service, and usually had to 
pay two fares for the privilege. 
The quality of the most flexible and deregulated mode, private buses, was 
inferior to that of the publicly operated modes, with lower frequencies and 
more restricted hours of operation even on services operating in comparable 
corridors. Only 16% of public transport journeys in 1950 were made on 
private buses, compared with 35% on the railways and 49% using the 
Tramways Board's services (MTC, 1969, Vol 1, p. 49). The problems of the · 
bus industry were generally acknowledged to be a result of the deregulated 
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environment inherited from previous decades (Maddock, 1992, p. 32-3). The 
MMBWnoted: 
there are about l 00 routes operated by privately owned buses ... A few of the 
private buses run to and from the city, but in most cases they act as feeders to 
rail and tram services ... On account of infrequent service and poor co-
ordination the saving in walking time by use of a feeder bus is largely offset by 
waiting time .. there are relatively few who can save much time by using these 
services. (MMBW, 1953: 184) 
One indicator of the ineffectiveness of public transport, particularly buses, 
was the high rate of suburban bicycle use observed in the MMBW survey. 
Only 1 % of workers employed in the central business district, served by rail 
and tram, cycled, with 18% travelling by car. But of workers employed in the 
suburbs, 17% cycled compared with 18% who travelled by car. In both the 
CBD and suburbs, some 5% travelled by bus. Since few cyclists were 'choice' 
passengers, they rapidly switched modes as car ownership rose, with the 
Melbourne-wide bicycle mode share plummeting from 9.5% to 1.9% between 
1951and1964 (Wood, 1965, p. 14.04). 
As Melbourne grew in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, more and more residents 
came to live beyond the reaches of the train and tram networks, and increasing 
numbers of journeys were made to locations other than the central business 
district. Car ownership was also rising rapidly. Patronage on rail and tram 
routes began to fall as some passengers began using cars; unless new patrons 
could be found to replace those leaving, a vicious cycle of patronage and 
service decline would be established. The need for a co-ordinated response 
was identified by the MMBW: 
From the survey of the existing transport system and study of the probable 
needs of the future, it is apparent that, if the public transport system is to play its 
proper part in the essential movement of people and goods, there will have to be 
effective co-ordination of all forms of surface transport - trains, trams and 
buses. Only in this way will the public be given the best possible service at the 
lowest cost. (MMBW, 1953: 192) 
This is precisely what was being provided in Toronto in the 1950s, with buses 
used to feed passengers to trams and trains, but in Melbourne public transport 
remained uncoordinated and 'market driven'. Operators responded to falling 
patronage by increasing fares, reducing services and poaching one another's 
remaining patrons. In 1955, the Tramways Board actually dis-integrated its 
fare system, by abolishing transfer tickets which permitted passengers to 
switch tram routes at a discount; the same year, newspapers .reported dramatic 
reductions in private bus services. In the 1970s, the Tramways Board moved 
into bus operations, with a series of radial express routes along freeways, 
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many of which repeated the now-traditional pattern of 'annexing' patrons 
from parallel rail routes. Meanwhile, the financial position of the private bus 
operators deteriorated to such an extent that the State government stepped in 
with a subsidy in 1974, on condition that there be an independent review of 
the industry. The review (Wilbur Smith et al, 1976) recommended 
rationalisation of services and depots, but this did not occur. Tantalising 
references to the only possible source of patronage growth being rail 
passengers taking buses to reach stations (e.g. p. 38) were not reflected in the 
review's final recommendations. 
With no overall planning, little was done in these decades to provide services · 
to newly-developed areas. As extension of the tramway system stopped in 
1956, new suburbs were dependent on private bus services. But the small 
private operators lacked the financial and organisational capacity for a 
planned expansion, and the short 'one-man' routes inherited from the jitney 
era were a brake on the development of cross-suburban linkages. Springvale 
Road, Melbourne's busiest non-radial road, was provided with a bus service 
(route 888/9) only in 1981, following government-supervised negotiations 
among three separate operators who had previously run four short routes along 
sections of the road. Unfortunately, this move occurred two decades after the 
major period of suburban development along Springvale Road, and the service 
provided was of low quality (Table 1). The only significant, planned 
expansion of suburban bus services took place in the City of Doncaster & 
Templestowe, where the local private operator went bankrupt in the late 
1960s. The Tramways Board took over its bus routes and greatly increased 
services, although, in typical Melbourne fashion, based on competition with 
the rail and tram systems, rather than coordination. 
The 'Toronto model' 
If Melbourne public transport exemplifies 'public choice' in action, Toronto is 
a paradigm of c;omprehensive planning. The establishment of the Toronto 
Transportation Commission in 1921 paralleled the formation of the MMTB in 
1919, but with one principal difference. The Commission was given 
responsibility for all urban public transport within City of Toronto boundaries 
(except taxis) and operated an integrated system from its earliest days. The 
TIC was a municipal monopoly, which ensured that private operators were 
excluded, and that a full public transport service was provided to all 
residential areas of the City. As in Melbourne, the tramway system was 
rehabilitated rapidly, but in contrast with Melbourne, the system was multi-
modal from the start. Before the end of 1921, the TIC began using buses as 
feeders to the tram system (TIC, 1971, p. 6) and to test demand prior to the 
extension of tram services (Davis, 1978, p. 94). Frisken (1-984) points to the 
early diversification into buses as evidence of the TIC's innovation, and 
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Davis agrees that "Superior management probably explained the TIC's 
unusual efficiency" (p. 75). The organisation successfully weathered the 
Depression and was able, during the patronage boom of the war years, to 
accumulate a surplus of $25 million that was used to finance the building of 
the Yonge Street subway. 
The TIC did not serve areas beyond the municipal boundary: these were 
covered by four private firms supplemented by separate municipal offerings 
(some of which the TIC provided on.contract). Dissatisfaction with suburban 
public transport was a major reason behind the establishment of the new 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953 (Lemon, 1985, pp. 43, 110). 
The TIC (renamed the Toronto Transit Commission) became an agency of 
Metro, and suburban private and municipal bus operations were acquired and 
integrated into the TIC system. When urban rail appeared in 1954, the 
integration theme was continued. High on the list of 'primary design . 
objectives' for the new subway system was: "It would be built to facilitate the 
fast and convenient interchange of passengers between the subway and the 
connecting surface transit routes" (TIC, 1971, p. 25). 
Frisken (1990) draws a direct connection between the organisational structure 
of Toronto public transport and post-War service integration and expansion: 
Because the TIC had a monopoly on transit service within Metro, it was able to 
link suburban bus routes to subway lines, just as the city agency had used buses to 
feed streetcar lines .. The practice remains a cornerstone of the TIC' s servicing 
policy. The extension of subway lines into the suburbs has meant the addition of 
many suburban bus routes primarily for the purpose of generating subway ridership. 
This has undoubtedly meant that some suburban districts have received bus service 
earlier than they would have ... Between 1955 and 1963 the TIC doubled its annual 
mileage of suburban bus operation. (pp. 22-3) 
The TIC' s suburban expansion was carried out on a grid pattern, taking 
advantage of the configuration of the arterial road network. This grid of bus 
routes was designed "to meet the transportation needs of the increasing 
number of riders who travel locally within their own suburban districts" (TIC, 
1971, p. 12), while also providing direct access to the radial subway network. 
Three crises 
Toronto's decision to opt for planned public transport in 1921 has had far-
reaching consequences that may not have been appreciated at the time. Both 
Melbourne and Toronto faced a public transport 'crisis' following the first 
world war. In each city, the 30-year franchise of a private tram operator was 
due to expire; in 1916 in Melbourne, in 1921 in Toronto. In both cases, 
dissatisfaction with the private operator led to a public takeover of the system, 
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followed by a programme of tram reconstruction and extension in the 1920s. 
In Toronto, the solution of a municipal body probably seemed logical, given 
the existence of a City that covered most of the urban area, and the absence of 
a competing public rail system. In Melbourne, the small size of municipalities 
seemed to dictate a State government solution, and the existence of the 
Victorian Railways (and possibly a failure to foresee the rise of the bus) may 
have discouraged a multi-modal authority. In Toronto, the idea of a single 
monopoly operator had been established during the previous period of private 
ownership, and according to Davis (1978, pp. 88-9) prevented the construction 
of uneconomic lines as occurred in the US and, as already noted, in 
Melbourne. 
But these divergent paths led to significant consequences in the 1920s and 
1930s: an integrated system in Toronto; a non-system in Melbourne. Both the 
MMTB and the ITC appear to have been well-managed organisations, and 
Melbourne provided the more favourable operating environment, with lower 
incomes and car ownership. The Tramways Board was crippled, however, by 
competition from the railways and private bus operators, and prevented by its 
single-mode charter from taking advantage of the synergies produced by the 
network effect. 
This divergence in tum led to quite different responses to the second public 
transport crisis, the explosion of car ownership in the 1950s. The massive 
service expansion in the suburbs of Metro Toronto Frisken has described took 
place at a time when service levels in Melbourne were in rapid decline. 
Toronto met the crisis of increasing automobile ownership with a planned 
counterattack; Melbourne succumbed to a vicious cycle of decline. The 
performances of the two cities reversed (Figure 2), Melbourne beginning with 
the higher patronage, but ending with the lower. A similar picture can be 
found with government subsidies for public transport. In Toronto, these were 
introduced as deliberate policy initiatives, firstly special subsidies in 1956 and 
1963 to prevent fare rises, and then a permanent subsidy introduced in 1971, 
initially to avert a fare rise then, in 1973, to allow a two-zone fare system 
which charged higher fares to suburban travellers to be abolished. In 
Melbourne, subsidies also began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but in an 
unplanned way: deficits simply appeared as patronage declined and the 
traditional responses of fare rises and service reductions failed. The outcome 
by the late 1980s was that Toronto's planned subsidy was relatively lower, at 
32% of operating costs (ITC, 1989, p. 32), than Melboume's unplanned 
deficit, 57% of operating costs (MTA, 1987, p. 42). 
Public transport in both cities faced a third crisis in the early 1970s, when 
unpopular major freeways were cancelled. In another parallel, in each case the 
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decision was taken by a newly-appointed 'reforming' Premier anxious to 
rehabilitate the image of a traditionally conservative party. Both Bill Davis in 
Toronto and Dick Hamer in Melbourne promised a greater emphasis on public 
transport. In Toronto, following an unproductive diversion into new 
technology, this took the form of a redoubling of the already-successful model 
of comprehensive service provision, coupled with the abolition of the two-
zone fare system. In Melbourne, nothing really happened, as there was no 
model of successful public transport to apply. Within a few years spiralling 
deficits Jed to the 'Lonie enquiry' (VTS, 1980), which proposed the most 
radical service reductions in history, floated the prospect of completely 
eliminating trams and led to the revival of many of the freeways cancelled in 
the early 1970s. 
Melbourne's one concession to planning was the inauguration of a multi-
modal fare system in 1981, ironically a recommendation of the Lonie report. 
In 1983, the Victorian Railways was amalgamated with the MMTB in 1983 to 
form a Metropolitan Transit Authority (later Public Transport Corporation), to 
which the languishing private bus operators were made contractors at their 
own request (Maddock, 1992, p. 57). The multi-modal fare system produced 
an immediate increase in patronage on all three modes of public transport, the 
first such increase since the Second World War, and probably saved the bus 
operators from extinction (Maddock, 1992, p. 24). The TTC's fare system has 
been fully multi-modal since 1923 (ITC, 1971, p. 6). 
The success of Melbourne's single fare system was not followed up with the 
obvious next step, the integration of services into a comprehensive, multi-
modal network. The dramatic improvement in suburban bus services that this 
would have required was ruled out by the Ministry of Transport in a study 
carried out for a new State government elected partly as a result of public 
anger over the Lonie report. The study relied on conventional elasticities of 
demand and ignored the network effect (Ministry of Transport, 1982, pp. 32-
35). Even inexpensive measures, such as co-ordinating rail and bus timetables, 
were generally ignored. For example, Monash University, which has 25,000 
staff and students, is two kilometres from the nearest rail station, Huntingdale. 
The principal bus service to the University, 'good' by Melbourne standards, 
used to run half-hourly throughout the evening from Mondays to Saturdays, as 
did the train service through Huntingdale. Each bus passed by the station, 
missing the train by one minute (ensuring a wait of 29 minutes for the next 
train), all evening, six nights per week, for more than a decade until 1990, 
when the bus company removed most evening services due to 'lack of 
demand'. 
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Public transport in the two cities today 
Public transport in Melbourne remains a series of unconnected routes and 
modes, rather than a network. The Public Transport Corporation's Melbourne 
'Travel Guide' (PTC, 1995) contains separate maps of the rail and tram 
systems, with no information about connection points and no map of bus 
services. Information about buses is confined to the following: "Operating 
hours vary for local bus services run by private companies. Contact the Met 
information centre for further details." The conservative Victorian government 
elected late in 1992 is in the process of reversing what little integration was 
achieved in the 1980s, in line with the Industry Commission's public choice 
'reform package'. The Public Transport Corporation has been split into 
separate rail, tram and bus divisions, while private bus operators have been 
granted greater 'commercial freedom', which some are using to reintroduce 
single-mode tickets. 
Public transport in Melbourne is 'flexible', but in a different sense to that 
predicted by public choice theory. Service quality varies wildly across the 
city, and patronage varies along with it. Variations are not based on 
population density or any 'rational' criterion, but on history (areas with trams 
receive much higher service levels than similar areas served by buses) and 
personality (two private bus operators service South-East Melbourne; one 
operates a basic hourly service, the other a half-hourly schedule. The better 
service is provided to the area with lower population density and higher 
incomes). Bus services in particular are of extremely low quality (except for a 
few routes replacing former tram services), with a confusing and inefficient 
route structure, outdated and inappropriate vehicles (generally bus bodies 
mounted on truck chassis) and poor frequencies and hours of operation. Only 
7 routes operate at all on Sunday evenings in the whole city. The result is that 
the majority of Melburnians have no access to public transport after about 7 
pm or on weekends, and those served by public transport have a limited 
choice of destinations. 
Intermodal integration is, except for fares, virtually non-existent. Facilities for 
passengers changing modes are poor, with patrons frequently having to cross 
busy roads to reach bus stops from railway stations. Timetables are generally 
uncoordinated, even though most bus routes terminate in shopping centres 
which, for historical reasons, are near railway stations. The rail and tram 
systems depend, due to lack of feeder services, on patrons living within 
walking distance of routes, and generally operate at only a fraction of 
capacity. Train and tram services are slower and less frequent than before the 
War. 
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Even in Melbourne's inner suburbs, public transport fails to provide a 
comprehensive service. The City of Brunswick, 5 kilometres North of central 
Melbourne, provides a good illustration. Brunswick is densely populated 
(overall density across the municipality was 37 per h~ctare in 1991), with a 
grid road network, low car ownership and a municipal council that supports 
public transport. Public transport is provided by four radial tram lines and one 
electrified rail line, running North-South, and six private bus routes running 
East-West. The trams provide a high level of service by Melbourne standards, 
so Brunswick is seen as having 'good' public transport. But the trams run in 
parallel and bus services are of low quality, daytime frequencies being 30, 25, 
20 (three routes) and 16 minutes. As Hussler (1994) notes, such frequencies 
ensure that trips requiring transfers cannot conveniently be undertaken by 
public transport, so for practical purposes the situation is analogous to the first 
stage of the Squaresville example (Figure l ). For example, less than a quarter 
of the population can reach the Municipal library while it is open on Sunday 
afternoons, as five of the six bus routes do not operate at all on Sundays, while 
the remaining route runs hourly, making the tram-bus transfer necessary to 
reach the library impractical. As the MMBW noted in 1951, infrequent 
services and poor co-ordination render the buses ineffective as feeders to the 
rail service (only 3 of the 6 routes even pass by stations), which consequently 
is poorly patronised, carrying only 12,000 passengers per day. There are no 
trains after 7 pm or on Sundays, and the line has often been threatened with 
closure. 
By contrast, public transport in Metro Toronto today is 'inflexible', as public 
choice theorists might have predicted. A uniformly high level of service is 
provided throughout the urban area by an easily understood grid network of 
buses and trams, which feed the rapid transit system, as well as serving local 
and cross-suburban travel needs. Changing between bus and rail is very 
convenient owing to a unique feature of the Toronto system: at most stations 
buses and trams take passengers inside the 'fare-paid' area, eliminating the 
need for transferring passengers to show tickets. What surprised me on a 1994 
visit was the extent, and convenience, of bus-to-bus transfers, which are 
facilitated by frequent services, a simple network structure and the placement 
of bus stops at street intersections so as to facilitate transferring. Frequent 
services operate on most rail, tram and bus routes day and night, 7 days a 
week, providing passengers with the real flexibility that comes with freedom 
from juggling timetables. The cost of providing such high service levels is 
considerably reduced by the simplified route structure and intermodal 
coordination. The predictability, efficiency and integration provided by 
centralised planning permit a 'seamless' service that serves spatially and 
temporally diverse travel needs. As Dixon (1995, p. 143) notes, this system is 
flexible from the perspective that really counts, namely the passenger' s, in 
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contrast with deregulated systems, where the flexibility appears to accrue 
primarily to the operator. 
An illustration of the different systems in action is provided by a comparison 
of two bus routes serving comparable suburban territory (Table 1, page 5). 
As with service levels, public transport patronage in Toronto also shows a 
uniform pattern, with high usage in all areas. In 1986, public transport served 
between 19 and 37 per cent of total travel across the 17 planning districts that 
make up Metro Toronto, with an average of 26% (Frisken & McAree, 1993: 
43). Even in districts served solely by bus, mode share ranged from 19 to 
22%. Indeed, a number of suburban bus routes in Toronto carry more than 
50,000 patrons per day, more than ten times the patronage of the busiest 
equivalent service in Melbourne, and a figure exceeded by only one of 
Melbourne's 12 trunk urban rail routes. Public transport patronage in 
Melbourne varies dramatically, ranging from less than 5% of total travel to 
more than 30% across the 8 planning regions, with very low figures in the 
two-thirds of Melbourne beyond the terminals of the tram network. The 
average is below 10% (TRC, 1996). An indication of the extent to which the 
two systems operate as networks can be gauged from the access mode of 
urban rail travellers. Given that in each city some 80% of residents live 
beyond walking distance from stations, it is notable that only around 10% of 
Melbourne rail passengers reach the station by bus or tram, compared with 
approximately 75% for the Toronto subway. 
The proposition that integrated, regional planning is the key could be tested if 
there were areas in Toronto where public transport was provided on a 
comparable basis to Melbourne. Public transport in the outer suburbs beyond 
the boundary of Metro Toronto bears many similarities to the public choice 
model. Like the areas beyond the City of Toronto prior to 1954, these suburbs 
are not served by the TIC, but by a dozen separate municipal bus systems, 
supplemented by provincially-provided commuter rail. Comparing one such 
municipality, Mississauga, with Etobicoke, the neighbouring area of Metro 
Toronto, we find similar gross residential densities (29 and 33 persons per 
hectare respectively - IBI Group, 1990: Exhibit 12). But Mississauga's public 
transport is similar to Melbourne's: typical bus routes run half-hourly with 
little evening and no Sunday service, and fares are high for most travellers, 
who must pay an additional fare to transfer to the TIC subway system. Public 
transport in Mississauga accounted for 8% of travel in 1986, similar to the 
share in Melbourne, while the figure in Etobicoke was 19.5%. 
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Table 1 Bus service levels and patronage 
Suburb 







Bus route (no.) . 888/9 36 
Gross residential density along route (/ha.) 
Bus service (frequency in minutes):-
30 34 
Peak period 20 21/2 
Off-peak (daytime) 20 6 
Evening · No service 7112 
After-midnight No service 15-30 
Last bus on weeknights 6:06 pm 24 hour service 
Saturday morning 60 8 
Saturday afternoon 120 7 
Sunday No service 10 
Return fare to City (bus and train) $Au6.40 $Can3.00 
Daily patronage (weekday) 1800 40,000 
(~:TIC 1991; Statistics Canada 1992; personal comrriunications in 
Melbourne; ABS 1993) 
Conclusion 
Melbourne's unco-ordinated market-driven public transport systems have 
collectively proven less able to respond to the changing travel needs of a low 
density city than Metro Toronto's single, regionally planned system. In low-
density environments with high car ownership, public transport appears to be 
a natural monopoly, because patronage is too sparse to permit wasteful 
competition. This is not to suggest that Toronto has not made mistakes (the 
flirtation with Advanced Light Rapid Transit technology appears to have been 
one), or that Melbourne's approach provided no benefits at all (the single-
mode orientation of the Tramways Board may have contributed to the 
preservation of the tram system). But on balance, the 'Toronto model' appears 
to provide further "empirical dissent from the public-choice paradigm", at 
least in the area of urban public transport. Public transport operators in 
Melbourne have competed with one another; Metro Toronto's single operator 
has competed with the car. 
Environmental issues such as the greenhouse effect may constitute a fourth 
crisis for public transport in both cities, with the election of cost-cutting neo-
conservative governments in Victoria and Ontario adding a further challenge. 
In Toronto, encouraging public transport is an important part of the response 
to the environmental crisis. Metro's official plan, 'The Livable Metropolis', 
proposes a series of transit and planning initiatives directed towards travel 
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targets for increases in the share of trips by green modes (Metro Toronto, 
1992: 79). The challenge, as in the 1950s, is the growing development outside 
the TIC service area. 
In Melbourne, by contrast, public transport is not part of the official debate 
about issues like the greenhouse effect. The most recent metropolitan strategy, 
which proposes to more than double the size of the city's freeway network, 
notes that "public transport services a relatively small proportion of total trips" 
(Department of Planning, 1994: 33), but does not seek to change this situation. 
Meanwhile, the Victorian Environment Protection Authority' s greenhouse 
response focuses on improving the efficiency of car engines, and the 
promotion of 'urban villages'. And public choice- oriented transport planners 
are now proposing a radical, new policy for Melbourne: free-market public 
transport, featuring jitneys ! 
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